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COMMENTS
THE REQUIREMENT FOR MAKING FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN WASHINGTON
WILLIAM D. CAMERON
INTRODUCTION - WHY FINDINGS?
The doctrine that a court should make findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law as the basis of a judgment in a case tried by a court without
a jury originated with the so-called "Field" Procedure Code presented
to the New York legislature in 1848.1 Paradoxically, most western
states quickly incorporated the burdensome procedure into their respec-
tive codes, while New York admirably adopted a different system. The
New York system required findings only when an appeal was taken, the
findings of fact being for the sole purpose of facilitating the review.
Unfortunately, however, New York in 1860 fell victim to the procedure
here involved,' but later recovered by repealing the provision alto-
gether. Western states, like Washington where the system of findings
as a basis of the judgment in a jury-waived case has been statutory since
1854, have by and large retained the procedure.' In 1938 the require-
ment of findings of fact and conclusions of law as the basis of a judg-
ment in a jury-waived case gained a measure of dignity when the
United States Supreme Court promulgated the new Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.'
I See Hanson, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, An Outmoded Relic of the
Stage Coach Days, 32 A.B.A.J. 52-55 (1946).
2 New York Code § 268 as amended in 1852.
* New York Code § 267 as amended 1860. "The alluring resemblance between special
findings and the common law special verdict seems to have irresistibly forced the
findings into the record of the trial court." Sunderland, Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law Where Jtries Are Waived, 4 U. Cni. L. REv. 218 (1937), at 231.
4 RCW 4.44.050: "Findings and Conclusions. Upon the trial of an issue of fact by
the court, its decisions shall be given in writing and filed with the clerk. In giving the
decision, the facts found and the conclusions of law shall be separately stated. Judgment
upon the decision shall be entered accordingly." Check Rule 17, General Rules of
Superior Court, 34A Wn.2d 118, provides: "The trial court shall make findings of
fact in all equity cases, and in all law cases tried before the court without a jury."
Also see note 1, supra.
5 Rule 52, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In federal practice, the system of
findings dates back to 1865 when findings were legalized and the Supreme Court was
given power to review them and their sufficiency (13 STAT. 500 1865), later codified
in the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 773, 875 (1925). Note Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Tweed, 7 Wall. 44 (U.S. 1869), containing an early statement to the effect that the
opinion of the judge cannot take the place of findings. Also note old Equity Rule 70%
which made findings mandatory and under which the rule was evolved that the opinion
of the court might take the place of formal findings, if the facts and conclusions are
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Judges have been none too clear in their minds as to what useful
service the system of findings performs, whether they be required as a
basis of a judgment or merely required when an appeal is to be taken.
The Supreme Court of Washington has stated that the purpose of
findings is to enable the supreme court to review the questions upon
appeal.6
Granted that findings clarify the issues and thus facilitate the work
of the reviewing court in an ordinary appeal, why inject them, as a
complicating factor, into the proceedings for obtaining a judgment in
the trial court?
A quick answer may be that findings, when a judgment is entered
upon them, serve as a basis for a plea of res judicata. This argument
is not appealing. As a practical matter there is seldom any occasion to
plead res judicata as a defense. Where it becomes necessary to do so,
the fact that there are no findings on all the contested issues presents no
major difficulty. Certainly when a case is tried to a jury, the particular
facts found are not disclosed by the general verdict, and yet no prac-
tical difficulty arises when it later becomes necessary to determine those
facts or matters which were established in the former adjudication.
Indeed, in situations where a judgment on the merits has been rendered
in a former suit between the same parties or their privies, on the same
cause of action, the rule of res judicata operates as a bar, "not only to
questions presented, but to all matters which rightfully belong to the
litigation which the parties could, by exercising reasonable diligence,
have presented at the trial".7 If in this type of situation a judgment is
conclusive on all matters which might have been litigated and decided
in the former suit, then it is clear that findings are neither the basis nor
are they necessary for a plea of res judicata.
A second argument is often made-and it is a good one-that findings
and conclusions disclose the basis of the decision below and, therefore,
are of importance on appeal. Supposedly, findings not only save the
stated in it with sufficient explicitness. This latter rule is now codified in Rule of
Civil Procedure 52 (a), as amended in 1946: "... If an opinion or memorandum of
decision is filed, it will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law appear
therein." See 8 F.R.D. 271-95 and Chapter 52, 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, ch. 52 (2d
ed. 1948).
6 Kinnear v. Graham, 133 Wash. 132, 233 Pac. 304 (1925). Cf. Bard v. Kleeb,
1 Wash. 370, 376, 25 Pac. 467, 469 (1890), findings are designed to protect the
trial judge by enabling him to place upon the record his view of the facts and the law
in clear and unmistakable form. Western Dry Goods Co. v. Hamilton, 86 Wash.
478, 481, 150 Pac. 1171, 1172 (1915), findings are intended to facilitate review by
offering to the parties a means of bringing up the case without the trouble and expense
of a bill of exceptions.
7 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Davies, 2 Wn.2d 155, 161, 97 P.2d, 686, 688 (1940).
[AUTUMN
THE REQUIREMENT OF FINDINGS
appellate court time in understanding the basis of the decision below,
but also afford a means of determining whether the trial court has
applied the law to the evidence. This argument fails to support the
system of findings as a basis of a judgment, but it is meritorious when
the requirement of findings is supported merely as an aid to appellate
review procedure. However, the first part of the argument may be
questioned. When findings are made strictly for appellate procedure,
is the time saving feature real or illusory? In answer to this, it would
seem that when findings are challenged upon appeal, the court must
read the evidence on the point to adjudicate upon it, and if the findings
are not challenged, then they become unnecessary inasmuch as the
court could have assumed that all the essential facts to support the
judgment were found by the trial judge.
Probably the best argument for the requirement for findings is to
force the trial court to settle each principal fact issue which the parties
have contested.? In this manner the trial court may not avoid a decision
by entering a general judgment which, in the absence of findings, might
be erroneously presumed by the appellate court to have been based on
a fact decision fitting the result. If this were to occur, a litigant might
lose without either court actually considering a disputed controlling fact
issue. Moreover, without assurance to the losing party that his matter
has been dealt with carefully, there can be no justice.' The principal
argument against the findings system centers around the excessive cost
of findings and the useless labor involved, when considered in light of
the small number of jury-waived cases that are appealed. 0
The practical solution to the problem involved here is not far
removed from the New York system of 1852 to 1860. Future revisers
of the Washington system may do well to look at section 114 (b) of the
Missouri Civil Code, which provides that the trial court shall, if speci-
fically requested by counsel, make findings on any of the principal
controverted fact issues." The goal should be a system which places
8 See A Modern Substitute for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 32 A.B.A.J.
131 (1946).
"' See Editorial, Findings of Fact and Conchsions of Law in Equity and Non-Jury
Cases, 69 N.J.L.J. 116 (1946).
10 See note 1, supra. (In Los Angeles County, California, in the year ending June
30, 1941, only 13% of the contested cases tried by the court without a jury reached a
California appellate court for decision.)
11 Missouri Civil Code § 114(b) : "... If any party shall so request before final
submission of the case, the court shall dictate to the court reporter, or prepare and file
a brief opinion containing a statement of the grounds for its decision and the method
of determining any damages awarded; and may, or if specifically requested by counsel,
shall, include its findings on any of the principal controverted fact issues. All fact
issues upon which no specific facts are made shall be deemed found in accordance with
1956]
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the use of findings in the field of appellate practice and thus eliminates
in the trial court all the expense and useless labor resulting from the
substitution of special findings for the common law special verdict."
THE RULE IN WASHINGTON
In Washington the statute"1 requiring the making of findings of fact
and conclusions of law in cases tried by the court without a jury is
mandatory, and failure to make findings is reversible error even though
the appellant failed to request that findings be made and entered. 4 A
custom has grown almost into settled practice for the attorneys to
present findings, conclusions, and judgment for the signature of the
judge, and the latter has come largely to depend on such assistance.
However, it is the statutory duty of the judge himself to perform these
functions, and mandamus will lie to compel the superior court to pro-
ceed to final judgment in a cause." The rule does not require the trial
court to make findings in regard to every item of evidence introduced
in a case, but only "ultimate findings of fact concerning all the material
issues.'"1 Where the findings of fact are incomplete or defective in
some particular so that a doubt exists as to the theory on which the
case was decided, the supreme court will attempt to overcome the
difficulty by referring to the oral or memorandum decision of the trial
court or the conclusions of law, if helpful." Findings of fact that are
conclusions of law will be treated as such and will stand if there are
the result reached." An improvement on this provision would be a system not requiring
a party to request findings before judgment. A request for findings before judgment
would indicate that the party making the request was apprehensive of an adverse
decision, else he would not be preparing in advance to except. The presumption, how-
ever, is that each party expects a favorable decision. See Albin Co. v. Ellinger, 103 Ky.
240, 44 S.W. 655 (1898). Also, see note 12, infra.
12 Sunderland, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Where Juries are Waived,
4 U. CHi. L. Ray. 218 (1937).
13 Supra, note 4.
14 Cole v. Osborne, 21 Wn.2d 577, 152 P.2d 152 (1944) ; Colvin v. Clark, 83 Wash.
376, 145 Pac. 419 (1915).
15 State cx rel. Eilers Music House v. French, 100 Wash. 552, 171 Pac. 527 (1918).16 Bowman v. Webster, 42 Wn.2d 129, 134, 253 P2d 934, 937 (1953).
17 Bowman v. Webster, supra, note 16; the memorandum opinion may not be used
to impeach the findings, and on conflicting evidence, they "will not be disturbed unless
the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings." Clifford v. State, 20 Wn.2d
527, 148 P.2d 302 (1944). Cf. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395
(1948), wherein the Supreme Court said: "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Note
that by these criteria a review of the entire record by the appellate court is necessary
to determine whether or not a finding is erroneous; hence, one of the ostensible pur-
poses of findings, the time saving feature, is practically eliminated. Shorrock v.
Shorrock, 185 Wash. 623, 626, 56 P.2d 674, 676 (1936), ... where the findings are
merely defective, it will be presumed that the evidence supports the judgment." The
presumption is rebuttable.
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other findings of fact sufficient to support them." The reverse is also
true."
While it is proper practice to make separate conclusions of law, the
findings of fact are considered as controlling the conclusions of law.
The judgment, of course, must accord with the findings. If the judg-
ment does so accord, it is immaterial that the judgment is inconsistent
with the conclusions of law. The reason is that findings of fact must
be given the force of a special verdicd and the conclusions of law that
of a general verdict. A special verdict controls the general one.'
A collateral rule to the requirement of making findings is the rule
that if no error is assigned to the findings of fact, they are conclusively
presumed to be correct," and the supreme court will not review the
evidence upon which they are based." An offshoot of this rule is that
where a case has been tried to the court, the supreme court will not
review errors claimed in the admission of evidence, unless error has
been assigned to the trial court's findings of fact.2 '
FINDINGS, WHEN NECESSARY
Before the adoption of Superior Court Rule 17," findings of fact
were not required in equity cases, although if they were made, and if
the statement of facts should be included in the record before the
supreme court, the findings were considered and given great weight.5
Now, since the supreme court no longer considers equity cases de novo,
and in light of Superior Court Rule 17, there is apparently no
distinction between appeals in judge tried law cases and equity cases. 8
"8AMiller Lumber Co. v. Holden, 45 Wn2d 237, 273 P.2d 786 (1954). Gnash v.
Saari, 44 Wn.2d 312, 319, 267 P2d 674, 678 (1954), when findings of fact are so
incomplete that the supreme court is unable to determine on what theory the trial court
decided the case, and neither the memorandum opinion nor the conclusions of law throw
any light on the matter, the judgment will be set aside and the cause remanded with
instructions to the trial court to enter findings of fact on the material issues.
'o Coolidge v. Pierce County, 28 Wash. 95, 68 Pac. 391 (1902).
20 State v. Twenty Barrels of Whiskey, 104 Wash. 382, 176 Pac. 673 (1918).
Gilmartin v. Stevens Inv. Co., 43 Wn.2d 289, 261 P.2d 73 (1953), findings of fact and
general verdict inconsistent. See RCW 4.44.060, "...The findings of the court upon
the facts shall be deemed a verdict, and may be set aside in the same manner and for
the same reason, in so far as applicable, and a new trial granted.
"I Hansen v. Walker, 46 Wn.2d 499, 282 P.2d 829 (1955). But see note 32, infra.
22 Simpson v. Hutchings, 41 Wn.2d 287, 248 P.2d 572 (1952), Rule on Appeal 43,
34A Wn.2d 47.
23 Ibid.
24 Rule 17, General Rules of Superior Court, 34A Wn.2d 118. See note 4. supra.
25 Fisher v. Hagstrom, 35 Wn2d 632, 214 P.2d 654 (1950).
,6 Johnson v. Harvey, 44 Wn.2d 455, 457, 268 P.2d 662, 663 (1954). See Simpson v.
Hutchings, 41 Wn.2d 287, 289, 248 P.2d 572, 574 (1952), "Under this rule (Rule on
Appeal 43, 34A Wn.2d 47), there is no distinction between appeals in law cases and
equity cases, since Superior Court Rule 17, 34A Wn.2d 118, requires that findings of
fact be made in all cases tried by the court without a jury."
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The purpose of Superior Court Rule 17 was to extend to equity cases
the statutory requirement of making findings in law cases tried to the
court without a jury. However, it is not the purpose of the rule to
require findings of fact and conclusions of law where they were not
formerly required in actions at law."
(A) Trials - Civil
The statute29 requires findings "upon the trial of an issue of fact."
Accordingly, no findings are required when no issue of fact is presented
to the trial court." In the same vein no findings are required upon an
agreed case, or as to facts stipulated or admitted.3' Clearly, no findings
of fact nor conclusions of law are required in the case of a default
judgment or judgment on the pleadings,2 and to make them would be
improper." It follows that no findings are required in a case where the
defendant elects to stand upon his demurrer, since no issue of fact is
presented for decision,' and the same is true where plaintiff elects to
stand upon his complaint."5
At least several Washington cases categorically state that when an
action is dismissed at the conclusion of plaintiff's case, no findings of
fact are required." Much confusion results from such statements;
however, the supreme court has in Richards v. Kuppinger" advanced
the following rules as a test to be applied when the trial court grants a
motion to dismiss at the close of plaintiff's case:
(1) If the trial court's oral or written opinion shows that it treated
plaintiff's evidence as true and held as a inatter of law that
27 See Bowman v. Webster, 42 Wn.2d 129, 253 P.2d 934 (1953).
28 State ex rel. Wash. Water Power Co. v. Superior Court, 41 Wn.2d 484, 250 P.2d
536 (1952).29 Supra, note 4.
80 State cx rel. Wash. Water Power Co. v. Superior Court, 41 Wn.2d 484, 487,
250 P.2d 536, 538 (1952), "The issue presented... was purely one of law. Hence, no
findings of fact were required."
31 See Hopgood v. Miller, 107 Wash. 449, 181 Pac. 919 (1919), where the court
indicated that no finding is required where the fact is admitted by appellant or even
where the fact can be reasonably inferred from appellant's answer.
32 Waller v. Heinrichs, 133 Wash. 7, 233 Pac. 23 (1925), Finley v. Finley, 43 Wn.2d
755, 758, 264 P.2d 246 (1953), "In such case [the supreme court] will ascertain the
admitted facts by making its own examination of the pleadings." (It was not necessary
for appellant to challenge the findings of fact, such not being controlling).
3 Kinney v. Sando, 28 Wn.2d 252, 257, 182 P.2d 45, 48 (1947), it is "improper"
to make findings where "there was no evidence nor... any admissions upon which the
findings as a whole could be based."
34 State ex rel. Tollefson v. Novak, 7 Wn.2d 544, 110 P.2d 636 (1941).
35 See Kinney v. Sando, note 33, supra, where, oddly enough, plaintiff declined to
proceed after an oral demurrer to his complaint was "temporarily overruled," asserting
it was "simply a waste of time and expense." Judgment was entered dsimissing the
action with prejudice; affirmed.
U6 See, e.g., Arneman v. Arneman, 43 Wn.2d 787, 264 P.2d 256 (1953).
37 46 Wn.2d 62, 65, 278 P.2d 395, 397 (1955).
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plaintiff had not established a prima facie case, findings of fact
are unnecessary. The review is limited to determining the
sufficiency of the evidence to establish a prima facie case.
(2) If it appears from the opinion or findings that the trial court
has weighed the evidence and has found either:
(a) that the evidence in support of plaintiff's prima facie case
is not credible, or
(b) that plaintiff's credible evidence establishes facts which
prevent plaintiff from recovering,
then the trial court has established as a matter of fact that
plaintiff has not established a prima facie case and findings of
fact are necessary to apprise the supreme court as to what facts
the trial court has found."
Probably the greatest amount of confusion lies in those cases where
the trial court enters a judgment of dismissal upon the merits after
defendant has rested. A review of several cases will illustrate the
confusion.
State ex. rel. Eilers Music House v. French"1 was a proceeding
involving an application for writ of mandamus to compel the superior
court to proceed to final judgment. The relator had brought an action
against A and B to recover possession of a piano delivered to A under
a conditional sale contract. The possession of the piano had been
transferred to B in satisfaction of an indebtedness due him from A.
The cause was tried to the court which orally announced its decision,
which was in effect a finding for defendants, but no formal findings of
fact, conclusions of law, or judgment was entered. The supreme court
stated that "findings and conclusions are just as essential on the dis-
missal of an action as where an affirmative judgment is entered"."
However, in Cochran v. Nelson1 one of the questions on appeal was
whether the trial court, in view of its dismissal of the case after a trial
on the merits, erred in refusing to make and enter findings of fact. The
supreme court said, "We are of the opinion the trial court did not
commit error... ,,,42 and quoted Lamar v. Anderson," "Error is predi-
cated upon the failure of the lower court to make findings. The judg-
' For a recent statement of the rule, see Youngkin v. McMillin, 148 Wash. Dec.
401 (1956). Also see Robertson v. Ephrata, 148 Wash. Dec. 267 (1956).
111 00 Wash. 552, 171 Pac. 527 (1918).
- Id. at 554, 171 Pac. at 528.
4126 NVn.2d 82, 173 P.2d 769 (1946).
' Id. at 84, 173 P2d at 770.
" 71 Wash. 314, 128 Pac. 672 (1912).
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ment being one of dismissal, no findings were required."" The case of
Wise v. Vaughan" also cites with approval the Lamar case which, if
examined closely, may contain the key to clarification in this area. The
Lamar case was an action to recover upon a contract for sale of lands.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court dismissed the action, ruling
that the appellants, who had elected to ask judgment for commissions
rather than for damages for breach of contract, had previously aban-
doned their action for commissions. On appeal the supreme court
stated, "If appellants' contention as to the reason of the lower court's
ruling is correct, we do not know what finding of fact the court could
have made upon which to base its judgment, since it would appear that
the ruling was upon a point of law rather than a decision of facts.""4
In the Vaughan case, an action upon an attachment bond where the
holding was that there simply was no liability on the bond, the supreme
court could also have stated that the ruling was upon a point of law
rather than a decision of facts. The same is true as to the Cochran case,
which was an action to recover for an alleged violation of the Emer-
gency Price Control Act. The holding of that case was that the act did
not apply to the defendant under the circumstances, and that there-
fore the defendant plainly was not liable for the penalties prescribed
by the act. At this point it may be noted that the judgment of dismissal
in the Eilers Music House case required a decision of fact and not
merely a ruling upon a point of law; hence, the case can be distin-
guished from the Lamar, Cochran, and Vaughan cases. (The contro-
versy preceding the mandamus proceeding in the Rilers Music House
case involved a contested issue of fact. The trial court erred in refusing
to make, sign, and enter findings because of the failure of the litigants
to present them to it for action until the lapse of one year and a half
after his oral decision of the cause.) This analysis indicates the rule to
be that in cases tried on the merits to the court, where a judgment of
dismissal is thereafter entered, findings of fact and conclusions of law
are necessary unless the ruling was upon a point of law rather than a
decision of facts.4" This rule is consistent with the rules laid down in
44 Id. at 315, 128 Pac. at 672. (emphasis added.)
45 160 Wash. 505, 295 Pac. 126 (1931).
46 Lamar v. Anderson, 71 Wash. 314, 315, 128 Pac. 672 (1912). (emphasis added.)
47 Is the rule inconsistent with State ex rel. Howland v. Olympia Veneer Co., 131
Wash. 209, 229 Pac. 529 (1924) ? This was a mandamus proceeding to compel officers
of a corporation to transfer stock on the books of the company. In reversing a judgment
of dismissal for failure to make findings, the supreme court stated that the proceedings
presented nothing but legal questions and RCW 4.44.050, required the trial judge to
give his decision, dismissing the case, in writing, separately stating his conclusions of
[AUTUMN
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Richards v. Kuppinger 8
(B) Summary Judgment
Since a proceeding for summary judgment cannot be regarded as a
trial, in as much as issues of fact are not "tried", the conclusion is
inescapable that no findings of fact and conclusions of law are required
to be made by the court where a summary judgment is granted."
(C) Special Statutory Proceedings
While some statutes specifically require findings,"0 others do not. 1
Findings of fact and conclusions of law may not be necessary in statu-
tory proceedings where the applicable statute does not require findings
of fact to be made. For example, when a trial court is required by
statute either to affirm or set aside an administrative order, findings of
fact and conclusions of law probably are not required." Another
example is Washington's arbitration statute 3 which apparently does
not require the court to make findings and conclusions before entering
judgment in conformity with the award. In Hatch v. Cole" the supreme
court stated that:
The hearing upon exceptions to an award is not the ordinary civil action.
It is a special statutory proceeding and clearly does not contemplate that
the courts should make findings of fact or conclusions of law and there-
fore we find no error in the court's refusing to make such.
The Hatch case is probably in force and effect today even though the
arbitration statute under which it was decided has since been repealed
law and findings of fact. In Bowman v. Webster, 42 Wn.2d 129, 134, 253 P.2d 934,
937 (1953) the court categorically states the rule to be that findings of fact are required
where judgment for the defendant (or the plaintiff) has been entered after a full trial.
43 Supra, note 37.
"I See RCW 4.44.050, note 4, supra, "Upon the trial of an issue of fact.. ." Also,
see 8 F.R.D. 271, at 282 for a discussion of the necessity of findings where summaryjudgment is granted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Numerous cases
are collected in 4 Federal Rules Digest (1939-1955) at 52 al.
50 E.g., RCW 26.08.110 "... Upon the conclusion of a divorce or annulment trial, the
court must make and enter findings of fact and conclusions of law."
51 RCW 80.04.170, 81.04.170, provide among other things, that upon a hearing before
a court to review an order of the rate-making commission, the "court shall enter judg-
ment either affirming or setting aside the order of the commission under review." See
State, ex rel. Pacific County Bridge Co. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 152 Wash. 234,
240, 277 Pac. 995, 997 (1929), "This statute does not require findings of fact to be
made."
52 Ibid.
53 RCW 7.04.010-220
r4 128 Wash. 107, 109, 222 Pac. 463, 464 (1924). The case was decided under the
old arbitration statute, R.R.S. § 422 which provided that if no exceptions were filed
against the arbitration award, "judgment shall be entered as upon the verdict of a jury,
and execution may issue thereon, and the same proceedings [may be had] upon said
award, with like effect as though said award were a verdict in a civil action," (emphasis
added.) Cf. RCW 7.04.190, "Upon the granting of an order confirming, modifying,
correcting, or vacating an award, judgment or decree shall be entered in conformity
therewith."
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and replaced." Under the old statute the arbitrators did not have to
make findings and conclusions other than the award itself, and this has
not been substantially changed."
(D) Trials - Criminal
The case of Seattle v. Silverman" leaves no doubt that in view of
RCW 4.44.050 (see note 4 and Rule 17, General Rules of Superior
Court) and RCW 10.46.070 providing that, in a criminal case, the trial
shall be conducted in the same manner as in civil actions, findings of
fact and conclusions of law are necessary to support a judgment of
guilty in a criminal case tried to the court."
CONCLUSION
From this brief review it is apparent that the requirement for findings
in Washington is limited to contested issues of fact where the trial
court is obliged to weigh the evidence and base its ruling on a decision
of fact. The system of findings in Washington should be changed and
the requirement abolished, unless findings and conclusions are specific-
ally requested by counsel before or after final order or judgment. Under
this procedure, if no findings were requested by an appellant, the fact
issues would be deemed found in accordance with the result reached.
Since an appellant would be free to request findings even after judg-
ment, it should not be feared that adoption of this suggestion might tend
to restrict the scope of review and thus increase the power of the trial
judge. If an appellant believed that the trial judge was arbitrary or that
he arrived at his decision by extra-legal reasoning, he would, of course,
request findings after judgment. If a party strongly feared that the trial
court's decision would be adverse and wished to assure himself that the
trial judge dealt meticulously with each principal fact issue, he might
request findings before judgment. Occasionally, this might be done
even though no appeal was contemplated. Except possibly in the last
instance, the procedure suggested would transfer findings to the field of
appellate practice and yet preserve all the advantages of the findings
system. The result would eliminate a great deal of useless labor and
expense in all cases where no appeal is to be prosecuted.
55 RCW 7.04.010-.220.
56 See old statute R.R.S. § 424 and compare vith RCW 7.04.160.
57 35 Wn2d 574, 214 P2d 180 (1950).
58 Findings are required to sustain a judgment of contempt. State ex rel. Dunn v.
Plese, 134 Wash. 443, 235 Pac. 961 (1925).
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